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This study estimates the progressivity of benefit, the average benefit incidence and the 
marginal benefit incidence of public spending on selected public services in Nigeria, using data 
from  the  Nigeria  Bureau  of  Statistics  (NBS)  2004  Living  Standard  Household  Survey.  The 
analyses were carried out using Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP) 2.1. The results of 
the analyses show that spending on public services in Nigeria is not pro-poor. The marginal 
benefit incidence of spending on public services in Nigeria indicates that the poorest group only 
benefits more than the richest group from extra spending on public services which they already 
have relatively high access to. Finally, we use the findings of this study to formulate policy 
recommendations to make public spending in Nigeria pro-poor in order to accelerate the speed at 
which the poor enjoy additional benefits from increased access to public services in the country.  
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With  a  population  of  over  151  million  people,  Nigeria  is  the  most  populous  country  in 
Africa,  with  a  GDP  second  only  to  South  Africa  (World  Bank,  2008).  Nigeria’s  economy 
depends heavily on the oil and gas sector, which contributes 99 percent of export revenues and 
more than 80 percent of government revenues. Over about forty years of oil production, Nigeria 
has earned over $400 billion in oils exports (in 1995 dollars). With its large stock of human and 
natural resources, Nigeria has the potential to build a prosperous economy, significantly reduce 
poverty and provide the health and education services as well as the infrastructure its population 
needs. The available evidence, however, indicates that these resources have not been managed 
well  enough  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  population  in  terms  of  human  capital  development 
(Aigbokhan, et al, 2007). For example, Nigeria generated about 23 trillion naira (191 billion US 
dollars) from oil between 1981 and 2006, which is about 83% of total government revenue. 
However, total  government  spending  on  education  and  health between  1981  and  2006  were 
respectively just 3% and 2% of total government revenue. As for government expenditures on 
electricity  and  water,  they  were  even  lower  than  spending  on  education  and  health.  The 
government’s  small  financial  commitments  are  suggestive  of  poor  access  to  these  important 
social services (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). Ajwad and Wodon (2007) observed 
that  these  types of  infrastructure often  fail  to  reach  the  poor. The  extent to  which the  poor 
benefited  from  these  investments  in  social  capital  and  infrastructure  should,  however,  be  of 
interest to development economists due to the inequalities and social distortions which may have 
been generated by these investments. This makes analysis of the distributional impacts of public 
spending on education, health and infrastructure in Nigeria an interesting area of study. 
Policy makers are increasingly interested in the composition of public spending. This 
attention stems in part from the recognition that allocating additional spending to education, 
health  and  infrastructure  can  boost  economic  growth  while  promoting  equity  and  reducing 
poverty (Tanzi and Chu, 1998; Estache, 2006). Spending in these sectors is widely considered as 
an important explanatory factor behind changes in social indicators (Bidani and Ravallion, 1997; 
Gupta, Verhoeven and Tiongson, 1999). The use of public resources must emphasize efficiency 
and equity to be in the interest of both economic and social progress. Efficient management of 




Public  expenditures  offer  significant  opportunities  to  promote  growth  and  an  equitable 
distribution of the benefits of growth (Mainardi, 2007). The issue of equity in the distribution of 
economic benefits from public investment in human capital and infrastructural development is 
particularly critical in Nigeria due to pervasive poverty and high income inequality. In Nigeria, 
economic growth in the 1980s and 90s was accompanied by elevated income inequality, which is 
believed  to  have  widened  substantially.  Despite  past  policy  efforts  to  address  this  issue, 
inequality has increased the depth of poverty in Nigeria (Alabi, 2008). This is why the Nigerian 
government  often  states  that  equitable  income  distribution  is  one  of  their  macroeconomic 
objectives (Oyekale, Adeoti and Oyekale, 2006).  
Public spending on basic education, primary health and infrastructure can be justified in 
Nigeria because they benefit the poor. However, given the high level of income inequality and 
disparity in access to these human capital development resources, can increased public spending 
on basic education, health and infrastructure benefit the poor? Would it benefit the poor more 
than the rich? Do the very poor benefit disproportionally from improvements associated with 
these types of expenditures in relation to the less-poor or the non-poor? These questions must be 
answered if a country wants to achieve both short run and long run poverty reductions. More 
importantly, it is necessary to have information about the benefit incidence of public spending in 
order to develop and implement effective policies which improve the distribution of income and 
reduce poverty in Nigeria. Knowing the share of the poor who benefitted from past government 
spending can be used to effectively target future pro-poor spending. The question of who will 
benefit from further expenditures remains important, especially given that Nigeria increased its 
budget allocations to education, health and infrastructure by 13-16% in 2008 (Budget, 2008). 
The government of Nigeria has also promised to channel more money into education, health and 
infrastructure  to  achieve  the  7-Points  Agenda,  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs)  and 
Vision 2020. However, the extent to which this future spending will benefit the poor depends on 
the marginal benefit incidence of the spending. 
Many previous studies have analyzed the benefit incidence of public spending in African 
countries, but most of them did not incorporate marginal benefit incidence (Demery et al, 1995; 




Woldehanna  and  Jones,  2006).
1  Moreover,  many  studies  on  poverty  and  inequality  were 
conducted in Nigeria over the past ten years to provide more detailed knowledge in relation to 
poverty  reduction  in  Nigeria  (Adeyeye,  1999;  Adeyeye  and  Ajakaiye,  2001;  Alabi  and 
Oviasogie, 2003; Alabi et al, 2005; Aigbokhan, 1999; 2000; Alabi and Chime, 2006; Oyekale, 
Adeoti and Oyekale, 2006; Alabi, 2008). Most of these studies have examined the country’s 
poverty and inequality profile, but none have examined the benefit incidence of public spending 
in Nigeria. This study intends to fill that vacuum. It is not just the level, but also the efficiency of 
public spending and outlays that matters, along with how well the spending targets the poor. In 
that vein, we examine the progressivity of benefit, the average benefit incidence and the marginal 
benefit incidence of public spending on education, health and infrastructure in Nigeria. 
  The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section two deals with the conceptual 
and empirical frameworks of the study. Section three is devoted to the research methodology 
employed in the study. Section four presents and discusses the study’s findings, while section 
five concludes the study with policy recommendations. 
2.0 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review  
2.1 Conceptual Framework for Benefit Incidence Analysis 
Benefit  incidence  analysis  (BIA)  is  best  understood  in  relation  to  the  concepts  of 
targeting and progressivity of social spending. Targeting refers to tools used to select eligible 
beneficiaries of a government intervention. In principle, it should concentrate the benefits of 
social assistance programs on the poorest segments of the population. All targeting mechanisms 
share  a  common  objective:  to  correctly  distinguish  between  poor  and  non  poor  households. 
Effectively differentiating between these groups is one way to improve program efficiency by 
increasing  the benefits  to  the  poor  with  a  given  program  budget  (Coady,  Grosh  and 
Hoddinott, 2004).  One  way  to  assess  targeting  of  government  subsidies  uses  a 
graphical representation of the distribution of benefits, such as a concentration curve or a benefit 
concentration curve. A concentration curve plots the cumulative “benefits” of public spending on 
the  y-axis  and  the  cumulative  distribution  of  the  population sorted  by  per  capita  income  or 
                                                           
1 The few recent improvements in these studies include work by Atemnkang et al, 2005 (for Cameroon), Doubouya 
et al, 2008 (for Guinea), Kamgnia, 2008 (for Cameroon) and Djindil et al, 2007 (for Chad). However, they used non-




consumption on the x-axis. One can assess the progressivity or regressivity of a particular public 
spending program by comparing the benefit concentration curve with the 45-degree diagonal and 
the  Lorenz  curve  of  income/consumption.  The  diagonal  indicates  a  “perfect”  distribution  of 
benefits, with the  poorest 20 percent accounting for 20 percent of the program’s expenditures, 
and  so  on  for  the  other  income  groups.  The  diagonal is  thus  also  referred  to  as  the  perfect 
equality (PE) line. The distribution of benefits is said to be progressive if lower income groups 
receive a larger share of the benefits from government spending than richer income groups. For 
instance,  if  the  concentration  curve  lies  above  the  diagonal,  then  the  poorest  20%  of  the 
population receives more than 20% of the benefits, and the distribution of benefits is thus said to 
be progressive in absolute terms (see graph 1). Conversely, if the benefit concentration curve lies 
below  the  diagonal,  then  the  poorest  20%  of  the  population  captures  less  than  20%  of  the 
benefits  and  the  distribution  of  benefits  is  said  to  be  regressive  in  absolute  terms.  The 
concentration curve can also be compared to the Lorenz curve: a benefit concentration curve 
above the Lorenz curve of income indicates that the public subsidy is more progressive than the 
distribution of income (Hakro and Akram, 2007). This implies that the share of the benefits 
enjoyed by the poorest 20% of the population is larger than their share of income. Conversely, 
a concentration curve that lies below the Lorenz curve of income distribution suggests that the 
transfers are  more  regressively  distributed than  income.  The  concentration  index  is  the  most 
common summary measure of benefit incidence. It is estimated much like the Gini coefficient 
but is based on the concentration curve instead of the Lorenz curve.  
2.2 Conceptual Framework for Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis 
The conceptual framework for this study extends a framework proposed by Ajwad (1999) 
and Ajwad and Wodon (2007) for analyzing allocation rules for investments in public services 
by  local  governments.
2  Their  framework  considered  an  administratively  autonomous  unit, 
namely a department. The department is in turn divided into two municipalities, one with rich 
residents (R) and one with poor residents (P). The local government at the department level is 
responsible for public investments in two types of services: the provision of public schools and 
the  expansion  of  access  to  basic  infrastructure.  It  is  also  assumed  that  the  rich  and  poor 
municipalities have their own budget for each type of service and that local governments have no 
                                                           




discretion in allocating their budget between the two services. The policymaker, however, has 
discretion over budget allocations for each of the two municipalities. The department has an 









Source: Cuenca, 2008 
Graph 1: Lorenz and Concentration Curves 
This budget can be allocated between the rich and poor municipalities, subject to E = ER 
+  EP,  where  ER  and  EP  are  the  investments  for  expanding  access  in  the  rich  and  poor 
municipalities. The household access rate in each municipality is Si = fi(Ei), for i = R, P. This 
specification allows municipal characteristics (e.g., wealth, distance from existing infrastructure, 
etc.) to affect the impact of investment expenditures on access rates. The functions fR and fP are 
increasing and strictly concave, such that fi ́(Ei) > 0 and fi  ̋(Ei) < 0 for i = R, P. Access rates thus 
increase with investment expenditures but the marginal gains diminish with expenditures. For 
any given level of expenditures, it is assumed that the access rate in the rich municipality is 
higher than the access rate in the poor municipality. It is thus assumed that fR(e) > fP(e) for all 
expenditure levels between 0 and E for both education and infrastructure, implying that access to 
schools and to infrastructure is higher in the rich municipality. The crucial difference between 
infrastructure and education services is that, for infrastructure, an increase in expenditures raises 




E]. The higher marginal impact of expenditures on access rates in the rich municipality may 
occur  because  rich  households  tend  to  be  located  closer  to  existing  infrastructure  than  poor 
households. Poor households tend to live in sparsely populated areas, which are often difficult to 
reach.  Therefore,  the  cost  of  providing  access  to  an  additional  household  living  in  the  rich 
municipality is lower than the cost of providing access to an additional household living in the 
poor municipality. To prevent a corner solution where all public expenditures are spent in the 
rich municipality, it can be assumed that the last dollar spent in the poor municipality has a larger 
impact on access rates than the first dollar spent on the rich municipality, i.e. fP ́(E) < fR ̋(0). 
For education, it can be assumed that an increase in public expenditures raises the school 
enrolment rate more in the poor than in the rich municipality, with fP ́ (e) < fR  ̋ (e) for all e 
ϵ[0,E]. This is a reasonable assumption because those living in the rich municipalities are likely 
to send their children to school even if a low density of public schools in their own municipality 
means  that  the school  is  relatively  far  away.  In  other  words,  the  absence  of  a  conveniently 
located school in a rich neighbourhood is presumed to pose a smaller barrier to education than 
the  absence  of  a  school  in  a  poor  neighbourhood.  As  in  the  case  of  infrastructure,  corner 
solutions can be avoided by assuming that the first dollar spent in the rich municipality increases 
the school enrolment rate by more than the last dollar added in the poor municipality, i.e., fP ́(E) 
< fR ̋(0). 
Graphs 2 and 3 respectively illustrate the profile of access to schools and infrastructure as 
a function of local public expenditures. The access rate profile for the rich (R0RE) and poor 
(P0PE) municipalities are such that the slope of the access rate production function in the poor 
municipality is always greater than the slope in the rich municipality for education, while the 
opposite is true for infrastructure. The combination (PE, R0) in the following graph would occur 
if the department’s funds were entirely allocated to the poor municipality, while (P0, RE) would 



























Graph 3: Access rates in infrastructure as a function of expenditures 
 
The resource constraint E = ER + EP and the functions fi  ́(Ei) > 0 for i = R, P can be combined 
to  generate  a  transformation  curve  for  the  relationship  between  the  access  rates  in  both 
municipalities. Writing the access rates as SR = fR(E − EP) and SP = fP(EP) in the rich and poor 
municipalities, and taking the total differentials of these two functions, yields dSR = −fR ́(E − 
EP)dEP and dSP = fP ́(EP)dEP. The slope of the transformation curve is thus: 
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=  < 0  (1) 
With  a  fixed  budget,  a  higher  increase  in  the  access  rates  resulting  from  investment 
expenditures  in  one  municipality  implies  a  smaller  increase  in  access  rates  in  the  other 
municipality. 
Graphs 4 and 5 plot the transformation curves for the access rates in the two municipalities for 




combination in graph 2, a point that is reached when all available funds are distributed to the rich 
municipality, while point B is equivalent to the (PE, R0) combination in graph 2, which results 
when E is fully spent in the poor municipality. If the policymaker has a higher implicit weight on 
the welfare of either of these groups, then one of these outcomes are more likely to be observed. 
At  point  G,  average  access  rates  are  maximized  (there  is  tangency  with  a  linear  objective 
function  at  this  point, giving equal weights  to  the  poor  and  rich  municipalities).  Investment 
productivity is equalized in the two municipalities at this point G, with the transformation curve 
having a slope equal to −1, since maximizing the average access rate [fP(EP) + fR(E − EP)]/2 
requires that fP  ́(EP) = fR  ́(E − EP). Point C on the 45
 degree line represents the allocation that 
equates the access rates in the two municipalities (SR = SP). At point C, the slope equals −fR 
́(ER)/fP ́(EP). Given that EP > ER, this ratio could have an absolute value of either greater or less 
than one. For education, fP  ́(e) > fR  ́(e), so the slope of the transformation curve is less than −1 
at C. On the other hand, fP  ́(e) < fR  ́(e) for infrastructure and the slope of the transformation 











Graph 4: Access rate transformation curve for infrastructure 
Despite the fact that the position of G relative to C may be ambiguous, one conclusion 
can still be drawn from the model if it is assumed that authorities have one consistent goal 
regardless of the type of public services provided. Consider the goal of maximizing access rates 
in the department regardless of the distributional outcomes. To maximize average access rates, 
the  government  chooses  point  G  for  both  education  and  infrastructure.  In  the  case  of 




in the rich municipality, G will be uphill from C, such that the rich municipality receives more of 
the benefits. This is contrasted by the situation where G lies downhill from C, in which case the 
poor municipality receives more of the benefit from the additional expenditures because of a 
higher marginal impact of spending on access in the poor municipality (for example, education). 
Thus, the relative position of G and C depends on whether the rich or the poor experience the 
highest impacts from investments in their respective municipalities. According to Ajwad and 
Wodon (2007), there are at least three other possible outcomes given the model’s framework. 
One is that an increase in access to public services offers the greatest benefits to the rich for both 
infrastructure and education. This would suggest that policymakers place more weight on the 
welfare of the rich, possibly due to this group’s lobbying power. Another is for an increase in 
access to public services to disproportionately benefit the poor for both types of services. This 
outcome  may  result  if  policymakers place  a  higher  weight  on  the  welfare  of  the  poor  or  if 
policymakers pursue a strategy of equalizing outcomes for both services. This could occur if 
current access to public services favoured rich municipalities, allowing pro-poor spending on 
public services to erode disparities between municipalities. A third case is when increases in 
access to education disproportionately benefit the rich while increases in infrastructure are more 
targeted  to  the  poor.  A  situation  that  could  reasonable  lead  to  this  outcome  would  exist  if 
policymakers  did  not  need  to  provide  infrastructure  services  to  rich  municipalities  who  are 
already  serviced  by  private  infrastructure,  while  the  rich  continued  to  use  public  education 










Graph 5: Access rate transformation curve for education 




A  policy  change  that  increases  spending  will  not  necessarily  maintain  a  constant 
distribution of benefits for current beneficiaries and may even benefit those who are not current 
beneficiaries. In these cases, standard benefit incidence analysis may not be sufficient to analyze 
the distributional effects of public spending, as demonstrated by Younger (2003) for rural Peru. 
In response to these observations, several recent studies have proposed alternative methods to 
measure the marginal benefit incidence (MBI) of public spending. Marginal incidence analysis 
measures the incidence of actual increases or proposed cuts in programme spending. Based on 
evidence from Yemen, Middle East and North Africa, Van de Walle (2002) indicated that MBI 
departs from a standard benefit incidence analysis that attempts to estimate how the average 
benefits from public spending are distributed at a point in time. The latter can be misleading 
about how changes in public expenditures will be distributed. It is possible, for example, that the 
political economy of incidence means that the rich tend to receive a large share of inframarginal 
subsidies, while the poor benefit most from extra spending. Ravallion (1999) provided a model 
of the political economy of fiscal adjustment that can generate such an outcome. He looked at a 
selection  of  poor  countries  to  identify  the  marginal  incidence  by  comparing  the  average 
incidence  across  geographic  areas  with  differing  degrees  of  programme  sizes.  Lanjouw  and 
Ravallion (1999) estimated the ‘marginal odds of participation’ for each expenditure quintile by 
regressing the participation rates of each quintile with average participation in each state in India. 
Lanjouw  et  al  (2002)  applied  a  similar  technique  to  panel  data  to  control  for  fixed  effect 
characteristics in Indonesia, as did Ravallion (1999) for a selection of poor countries. Younger 
considers marginal incidence as the distribution of compensating variations for marginal policy 
changes, based on estimated demand for public services in Ecuador (1999) and Peru (2002).  
Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) found that primary school enrolment rises with per capita 
household expenditures at the national level and in every state in India. They also found that 
enrolment tends to be lowest in the poorest quintiles, and increases with consumption per person. 
The improvement in the average probability of enrolment (the marginal benefit) suggests that 
subsidies to primary schooling would mildly favour the non poor.
3 With a data set from Ecuador, 
Younger (1999) used a combination of the benefit and behavioural approaches and found that 
public spending improves health and education indicators. Ajwad and Wodon (2002) investigated 
whether the poor benefit from an expansion in access to public services more or less than the non 
                                                           




poor. They applied a marginal benefit incidence analysis to local-level data from Bolivia and 
Paraguay to answer this question. Their results indicated that the marginal benefit incidence is 
higher (or at least not systematically lower) for the poor than for the non poor in education, but 
that this was not the case for many basic infrastructure services. More generally, it appears as 
though the poor only gain access once the non poor already have high levels of access.  
Ajwad and Wodon (2003) estimated average benefit and marginal benefit incidence for 
Sri Lanka. Their study revealed that the highest disparities between the access rates of rich and 
poor households are for access to electricity and indoor taps (a piped water connection within the 
house). In terms of access to electricity for lighting, nearly 60 percent of households have access 
to electricity, but this figure is less than 40 percent of the poorest households and 80 percent for 
the richest households. Similarly, 15 percent of households have a tap in their house, but this 
includes just 4 percent of poor households versus more than a third of the richest households. In 
many cases, their estimates suggest that households in the poorest quintile would benefit more 
than the average household from an overall increase in access rates. This is the case for access to 
a property title, protected well, unprotected well, private or public latrine, primary school, and 
main road. Ajwad and Wodon (2003) indicated that, although there are important differences 
between different types of services, the marginal benefit incidence is often more pro-poor than 
the benefit incidence, particularly when the non-poor already have high levels of access. 
Ajwad  and  Wodon  (2007),  in  their  study  in  Bolivia,  found  that  about  43%  of  all 
households have access to piped water while 11% of households have sewage draining facilities. 
Slightly more than a third (37%) of all households have access to electricity and about 2% of all 
households have access to telephones. They indicated that participation rates in pre-primary, 
primary  and  secondary  schools  increase  with  municipality  wealth,  as  does  access  to 
infrastructure.  However,  the  disparity  in  access  rates  between  the  rich  and  poor  was  more 
pronounced for educational infrastructure. Access rates for piped water, sewage, and electricity 
for the rich quintile were respectively 3.8, 12.5 and 11.8 times greater than the access rate in the 
poorest quintile of municipalities. They also found that the overall increases in participation rates 
in  pre-primary,  primary  and  secondary  schools  appeared  to  benefit  poor  and  middle-income 
municipalities more than rich municipalities. The middle group showed the highest increases in 
pre-school  and  secondary  school participation  rates,  while  the  poorer  municipalities  saw  the 




municipalities exhibit the lowest levels of marginal benefit incidence for access to piped water, 
sewage, electricity, and telephones.  
As for Paraguay, they found that improvements in access to primary school were the 
most pro-poor, simply because most other groups of households already have access to primary 
schools. Improvements in access to telephones were the least pro-poor because even the highest 
quintiles  still lack  universal  access  in  this  sector.  Improvements  in  access  to  electricity  and 
secondary schooling tend to be pro-poor at the margin, whereas the gains in access to water and 
sewage were more evenly distributed. 
Kruse,  Pradhan  and  Sparrow  (2009)  estimated  the  marginal  benefit  incidence  for 
Indonesia.  Taking  into account  behavioural  responses  to  changes  in  public  spending,  they 
suggested  that  increased public  health  spending  is  associated  with  public  funds  being  more 
targeted to the poor. At the margin, increased local public health spending leads to a net transfer 
of public resource from the richest to the poorest quartiles of the population, as it increases both 
the use of public health care by the poor and the average benefit of public funds through use of 
these services.  However,  they  concluded  that  overall  impact  of  the  initial  utilization  shares 




3.1 Data Sources and Collections 
This  study  was  carried  out  in  Nigeria.  The  study  made  use  of  the  Living  Standard 
Household Survey conducted in 2004 by the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The Household 
Survey  was  carried  out  with  assistance  from  the  European  Union,  the  World  Bank,  the 
Department for International Development and the United Nations Development Programme to 
ensure that the generated data was of good quality. The survey had national coverage, which 
means that all 36 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory were covered. A two-
stage stratified sample design was used. The first stage involved dividing each state into clusters 
called enumeration areas (EA), while the second stage was the division of enumeration areas into 
housing units. One hundred and twenty (120) EAs were created for each state and a further 60 




were covered per month for twelve months. In each of the enumeration areas, 5 housing units 
were systematically selected and studied, with 600 housing units studied per state and 300 in the 
FCT. Overall, the survey has information on 96610 respondents from 19158 households. Data on 
education  (public  primary  and  secondary  school  enrolment),  health  (child  vaccination  and 
prenatal and postnatal consultations in a public health institution), publicly provided electricity 
and  pipe-borne  water,  socioeconomic  characteristic,  location,  region,  per  capita  expenditure 
(deflated by the current prices in each region) were extracted from the survey and analyzed in 
this study.  
3.2 Data Analysis Techniques 
3.2.1 Benefit Incidence Analysis 
  The main objective of using a benefit incidence approach is to analyse the distribution 
of benefits from the use of public services according to the distribution of living standards. Two 
main sources of information are used. The first provides information about household members’ 
access to public services and the second deals with government expenditures on public services. 
The  benefit  incidence  approach  combines  these  two  sources  of information  to  analyse  the 
distribution of public benefits and its progressivity. We performed a benefit incidence analysis 
using the Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP) 2.1 as described in Araar and Duclos 
(2009). This procedure was carried out for all categories of benefits (education, health, access to 
electricity and pipe-borne water) based on location (rural and urban), region and for the country 
as a whole. The advantage of DASP 2.1 is that the frequency data approach can be used when 
information about total public expenditures is unavailable.
4 This approach amounts to estimating 
the individual participation rate for each type of benefit by dividing the number of users by the 
eligible members in the households. The result is the household members’ rate of participation in 
the benefits of the programme.
5 
                                                           
4 We were not able to obtain information on expenditure on these public services (they remain unreleased). 
 
5 For primary school, the eligible member is any child between the ages of 6 and 11 years in the household, while 
the user is any child aged between 6 and 11 years who attends public primary school. For secondary school, the 
eligible member is any child between the ages of 12 to 18 years in the household, while the user is any child aged 12 
to 18 years who attends public secondary school. For child vaccination, the eligible household member is any child 
aged between one day old and 5 years old, while the user is any child in this age group who has already been 




 3.2.2 Progressivity of the Benefits (PB) 
  Progressivity of benefit (PB) was determined using DASP 2.1 procedure as described in 
Duclos and Araar (2009). Following their procedure, we estimated the progressivity of benefit by 
comparing  the  Lorenz  and  concentration  curves.  Household  expenditures  were  ranked  in 
increasing  order  while  the  benefits  (primary  and  secondary  school  enrolment,  vaccination, 
prenatal  and  postnatal  consultation,  access  to  electricity  and  pipe-borne  water)  were  ranked 
according to their associated expenditure. The concentration curve shows the share of benefits 
enjoyed  by  the  bottom  proportion  p  of  the  population.  We  supplemented  the  estimation  of 
progressivity with a concentration index. Generally speaking, the higher the index, the more 
concentrated  the  benefit  and  the  higher  the  resulting  inequality.  Hence,  the  most  regressive 
benefit scheme would be associated with the highest concentration index (Kamgnia, 2008). 
 3.2.3 Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis 
To  determine  whether  a  government  maximizes  average  access  rates  across 
municipalities over time, it is typically necessary to have panel data with information on both 
income or consumption and access to services across the various areas or administrative entities. 
Without such panel data, it is not possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity with respect to 
location.  Unfortunately,  panel  data  remain  unavailable  for  Nigeria  and  other  developing 
countries. This type of commonly encountered data limitation points to the need for a technique 
to  identify  the  beneficiaries  of  increased  public  service  provisions  which  only  uses  cross 
sectional  data.  Ajwad  and  Wodon  (2007)  and  Lanjouw  and  Ravallion  (1999)  proposed  an 
alternative empirical method which use a single cross section.
6 Both papers used geographic 
variation in access rates across regions in a country to estimate the expected evolution in a given 
region were that region to be followed over time. Cross sectional variation in access rates were 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mothers are eligible household members, while the user is any pregnant or nursing mother who has used publicly 
provided health facilities for prenatal or postnatal medical consultations. 
6 The approaches differ in the manner in which the countries are ranked. Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) classified 
municipalities as poor or rich according to their rank in the national distribution of income. Wodon and Ajwad 
(2007),  however,  classified  municipalities  according  to  their  rank  in  the  local  (i.e.,  departmental)  rather  than 





thus used to conduct a marginal benefit incidence analysis. Our estimate of the marginal benefit 
incidence followed the procedure used by Ajwad and Wodon (2007).  
Following the steps of Ajwad and Wodon (2007), we defined i = 1,…, N states, which in 
this case are the 37 states
7 in Nigeria. We ranked households by expenditure per capita within 
each state and assigned them to one of q = 1,…, Q expenditure brackets (these quintiles were 
defined at the state level). We denoted
q
iJ X  as the benefit incidence of a programme or service in 
household J belonging to interval q of state i. This benefit incidence reflects the share of the 
population  with  access  to  the  public  programme  or  service.  The  mean  benefit  incidence  in 
interval  q  for  state  i  is  denoted  by
q
i X ,  the  overall state mean is denoted  by i X and
q
i J is  the 




































1 1         (3) 
The households were ranked by the expenditure interval at the state level. An obvious weakness 
in this ranking is that the poorest household in the richest state may be richer than the richest 
households  in  the  poorest  state.  However,  this  approach  to  ranking  households  is  more 
appropriate in a relatively decentralized system, and is also appropriate (even at national level) 
when welfare improvements are evaluated in terms of relative rather than absolute deprivation 
(Ajwad and Wodon, 2007).
8 We then regressed the benefit incidence in each of the intervals 
against the state means, using Q regressions as follows: 
                                                           
7 These are the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. 
8 That is, each household compares its level of access to public services not in absolute terms, but in terms of its 



















































1 , 1 1
          (4) 
for q = 1,…, Q  
In the first and poorest interval (q = 1), equation 4 yields a regression of the mean level of 
programme participation in the poorest households in each state on the mean level of programme 
participation  in  that  state.  To  avoid  endogeneity,  the  right  hand  side  of  the  equation  was 
calculated at the state level as the mean for all households excluding interval q. We assumed that 
each interval in a given state has the same number of households ( i
q
i J J = ). With i
q
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for q = 1,…, Q 







































   (6)  
Equation 6 is an implicit restriction which allows the intercepts and the slopes to differ for 
various intervals. The restriction is that the average marginal increase in access from a unitary 
increase in mean access is one for each interval.
9 The restriction can be made explicit by totally 
differentiating  
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Writing β
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for q = 1,…, Q 
Therefore, a change in a programme’s benefit incidence for the household belonging to q, in 
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for q = 1,…, Q 



















, are the estimates of the marginal benefit incidence. 
A larger (smaller) value than one implies that the corresponding group of households benefits 
more (less) from an expansion in public programs or services than all households on average.  
Equation 6 was estimated using a non-linear least squares procedure.  
4.0 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Results and Discussion of Benefit Incidence of Public Spending in Nigeria 
4.1.1  Results  and  Discussion  of  Benefit  Incidence  of  Public  Spending  on  Education  in 
Nigeria 
Education is one of the most important services the poor need to escape from poverty. 
Likewise, in the Millennium Development Goals, education is seen as a powerful instrument not 
only for reducing poverty and inequality but also for improving health and social welfare, laying 
the basis for sustained economic growth, and as essential to building democratic societies and 
dynamic, globally competitive economies (United Nations, 2000). This motivates our analysis of 
the incidence of public spending on education in Nigeria. This subsection presents and discusses 
the average benefit incidence of public spending on education in Nigeria  
Table 1 presents the participation rates (access rates) in primary and secondary schools in 
Nigeria. The table reveals that about 77% and 56% of school-aged children were respectively 
enrolled in primary and secondary public schools. The table also shows that school-aged children 
in the richest group benefited more from public education spending than school-aged children 
from the poorest group in Nigeria. The table shows that public spending on school-aged children 
in the poorest quintile was respectively 15% and 14% of public spending on public primary and 
secondary schools, while these figures were about 23% and 25% for the richest quintile. 
The global average shares of school enrolment for children from the poorest quintile are 
respectively 26% and 14% for public primary and secondary schools (Shahin, 1999). Since the 
shares of the poorest quintile in school enrolment are respectively 15% and 14% in primary and 
secondary schools in Nigeria. This implies that the poorest income group in Nigeria has lower 




Monitoring Report (2009) has alluded to lower access to education by the poorest income group 
in Nigeria education system. However, our result is comparable with other findings from Sub-
Saharan Africa. For example, Djindil et al (2007) demonstrated that the share of spending on the 
poorest and the richest quintiles in Cote d’Ivoire was respectively 19% and 14% of public total 
spending on public primary education. In general, from the available data on benefit incidence of 
public spending in Sub-Saharan Africa, the richest quintiles benefited more than the poorest 
quintiles from education spending.
10 
As for regional disparity with respect to school enrolment in Nigeria, table 2 indicates 
that school-aged children in the southern parts of the country tended to benefit more from public 
primary and secondary schools than those in the northern parts of Nigeria. Table 2 reveals that 
the Southwest and South-south have the largest shares of public spending on public primary and 
secondary education, while the Northeast has the lowest share. It also shows that, while public 
spending on primary and secondary education was respectively 19% and 22% of the national 
total in both the Southwest and South-south regions, these figures were 11% and 9% for the 
Northeast region. The regional disparity reported here has also attracted international attention 
(Education for All Monitoring Report, 2009).  
In the case of rural-urban divide, table 2 shows that school-aged children in urban areas 
participated in education more than school-aged children in rural areas. In terms of their shares 
of  the  total,  urban  areas  received  53%  and  57%  of  total  public  spending  on  primary  and 
secondary education, while rural areas received the remaining 47% and 43% of public spending 
on primary and secondary education. The rural-urban divide in the Nigerian education system 
has been observed by other scholars. Huebler (2005) noted that primary enrolment was higher 
for  children  in  urban  areas  than  in  rural  areas  in  Nigeria.  Hazans  and  Trapeznikova  (2008) 




                                                           
10 However, in Ghana, the poorest and richest quintiles shared 22% and 14% of public spending on primary 




Table  1:  Benefit  incidence  of  public  spending  on  primary  and  secondary  education  in 
Nigeria 
  Primary education  Secondary education 
Quintile  Participation rate 
 
Share by quintile  Participation rate  Share by quintile  
 
Poorest  0.596  0.154  0.393  0.136 
Poor  0.723  0.187  0.523  0.182 
Average  0.789  0.204  0.565  0.196 
Rich  0.854  0.221  0.685  0.238 
Richest  0.904  0.234  0.717  0.249 
All  0.773  1.00  0.577  1.00 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NBS (2004) 
Table 2: Benefit incidence of public spending on primary and secondary education based 
on location and regions 
  Primary education  Secondary education 
Region  Participation rate  Share by 
region/location 
  
Participation rate  Share by 
region/location 
  
South-south  0.927  0.191  0.733  0.217 
Southeast      0.917  0.142  0.694  0.159 
Southwest  0.913  0.194  0.719  0.218 
North-central  0.843  0.174  0.583  0.147 
Northeast   0.617  0.114  0.377  0.086 
Northwest  0.563  0.185  0.406  0.173 
All  0.773  1.00  0.577  1.00 
Urban  0.855  0.534  0.656  0.569 
Rural  0.696  0.466  0.497  0.431 
All  0.773  1.00  0.577  1.00 





4.1.2 Results and Discussion of Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Health in Nigeria. 
The rationale for analyzing the incidence of public spending on education also applies to 
health. Improving the health status of the poor significant contributes to their ability to escape 
from poverty. Child vaccination and prenatal and postnatal hospital consultations are preventive 
measures to reduce infant and maternal mortalities, both of which were found to be higher in 
Nigeria  than  the  average  for  low  income  countries  (Okonjo-Iweala  and  Osafo-Kwaako, 
2007).
11,12  
Our results show that the vaccination rate among under-five-year-olds tends to be low in 
Nigeria,  as  seen  in  table  3.  The  table  indicates  that  only  46%  of  eligible  children  were 
vaccinated, including 51% from the richest and 44% from the poorest quintile. The NBS (2004) 
has documented reasons for low vaccination in Nigeria. The same trend of low participation is 
also noted for prenatal and postnatal consultations.
13  
The low rates of vaccination and prenatal and postnatal consultation have implications for 
under-five, infant and maternal mortalities in Nigeria. The under-five mortality rate of 194 per 
1000 births in Nigeria is higher than Sub-Saharan Africa’s average of 183 per 1000 births, and 
this has been attributed to the decline in child vaccination in Nigeria (Alabi and Adams, 2010). 
FIDH (2010) reveals that the quality, number and funding of healthcare facilities is inadequate in 
Nigeria  and  that  poor  access  to  prenatal  and postnatal  care  contributes  to  the  high  maternal 
mortality rate in Nigeria. FIDH (2010) also reveals that Nigeria has the world’s second highest 
maternal mortality rate after India, at 1100 per 100 000 births.  
Income-based  selectivity  is  also  observed  for  vaccinations  and  prenatal  and  postnatal 
consultations. For example, 19%, 13% and 11% of public spending on vaccinations and prenatal 
                                                           
11The fact that the estimated child mortality rate of 194 per 1000 children under the age of five in Nigeria is higher 
than  the  SSA  average  can  be  attributed to the  decline  in  immunization  between  1990  and  2007.  The  measles 
immunization rate declined from 54% to 35% within the period, whereas it increased from 56% to 73% between 
1990 and 2007 in SSA (Alabi and Adams, 2010). 
12 McGuire (2006) has shown that access to maternal and infant health programmes was positively correlated with a 
decrease in under-five mortality in a cross section of developing countries. 
 
13 The reasons for low participation in prenatal consultation cannot be solely attributed to the cost of vaccination, 
because only 55% of those who went for a prenatal consultation paid. The other reasons given by the women in the 
survey are that they did not know it was necessary (41%), unavailability of prenatal consultation in their area (18%), 





and postnatal consultations were the respective shares spent on the poorest quintile, while these 
shares were 22%, 28% and 29% for the richest quintile. This indicates that the richest quintiles 
benefited more than the poorest quintile from public spending on vaccinations and prenatal and 
postnatal consultations. Other scholars have also reported that the richest benefited from public 
spending on health in Africa more than the poorest quintile (Demery, 2000; Djindil et al, 2007). 
The north-south disparity can also be observed in the incidence of public spending on 
vaccination and prenatal and postnatal consultation in Nigeria as seen in table 4. The Southeast 
region had the highest share of national vaccination spending (23%) while the North-central 
region had the lowest share of spending on vaccinations (9%). However, the shares of prenatal 
and postnatal consultations were higher in the north. The Northwest’s share of public spending 
on prenatal and postnatal consultations were respectively 21% and 25%, while the share of total 
spending  on  prenatal  consultations  was  the  lowest  in  the  South-south  region  (13%)  and  the 
Southeast had the lowest share of spending on postnatal consultations. This may be due to the 
fact  that  health  institutions  which  have  the  capacity  to  administer  prenatal  and  postnatal 
consultations are more common in the north than in the southern regions of the country. NBS 
(2005) indicated that there are more public health care facilities in the north of Nigeria, while 
private health care is more common in the south. 
Table  4  also  indicates  that  the  location  effect  (rural/urban)  is  also  significant  in  the 
incidence of public spending on vaccinations and prenatal and postnatal consultations in Nigeria. 
The  table  shows  that  58%,  55%  and  54%  of  public  spending  on  vaccination,  prenatal  and 
postnatal care went to urban areas, while the remaining 42%, 46% and 47% of spending in these 
areas of public health were respectively spent in rural areas. The reasons for these disparities 
may  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  centres  which  administer  vaccinations  and  prenatal  and 
postnatal care were concentrated in urban areas. For example, Ogunbekun (1992) indicated that 
most health facilities in Nigeria are located in urban areas. Ojo (1990) also showed that there are 
inequalities  in  the  distribution  of  health  care  resources  in  Nigeria,  which  may  affect  the 







Table  3:  Benefit  incidence  of  public  spending  on  vaccination,  prenatal  and  postnatal 
consultation in Nigeria 
  Vaccination  Prenatal consultation  Postnatal consultation 
Quintile  Participation rate  Share by quintile 
  
Participation rate  Share by quintile 
  
Participation rate   Share by quintile 
  
Poorest  0.439  0.192  0.281  0.125  0.118  0.114 
Poor  0.450  0.197  0.358  0.156  0.167  0.162 
Average  0.448  0.195  0.411  0.186  0.197  0.192 
Rich  0.433  0.191  0.565  0.252  0.250  0.243 
Richest  0.511  0.244  0.634  0.282  0.296  0.288 
All  0.456  1.00  0.450  1.00  0.206  1.00 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NBS (2004) 
Table 4: Benefit incidence of public spending on vaccinations and prenatal and postnatal 
consultations based on location and region 
  Vaccination  Prenatal consultation  Postnatal consultation 





Participation rate  Share by 
region/location 
Participation rate  Share by region/location 
South-south  0.429  0.177  0.697  0.130  0.249  0.138 
Southeast      0.458  0.230  0.801  0.143  0.327  0.130 
Southwest  0.395  0.210  0.832  0.178  0.323  0.186 
North-central  0.444  0.093  0.525  0.158  0.233  0.150 
Northeast   0.448  0.115  0.411  0.183  0.160  0.142 
Northwest  0.625  0.175  0.231  0.207  0.141  0.253 
All  0.456  1.00  0.450  1.00  0.206  1.00 
Urban  0.445  0.579  0.599  0.545  0.271  0.535 
Rural  0.472  0.421  0.346  0.455  0.161  0.465 
All  0.456  1.00  0.450  1.00  0.206  1.00 




4.1.3 Results and Discussion of Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Infrastructure in 
Nigeria. 
Water  is  critical  for  the  welfare  of  the  poor.
14  This  justifies  our  investigation  of  the 
incidence  of  public  spending  on  pipe-borne  water  in  Nigeria.  Similarly,  we  analysed  the 
incidence  of  public  spending  on  electricity  because  energy  plays  a  decisive  role  in  the 
development process of a country. It not only enhances factor productivity but also promotes a 
higher standard of living.
15 
The results relating to the benefit incidence of public spending on pipe-borne water and 
electricity  are  presented  in  table  5.  The  table  shows  that  only  21%  and  45%  of  Nigerians 
respectively use pipe-borne water and electricity.
16 Low access to pipe-borne water is likely due 
to the fact that provision of pipe-borne water was not highly prioritized by the government of 
Nigeria  despite  its importance.  The  complete  lack  of  capital  expenditures  allocated  to  water 
resources between 2001 and 2004 in Nigeria stands as evidence of this low prioritization of 
access to water (CBN, 2007). In fact, as of 2007, the ministry of water resources was merged 
with ministry of agriculture. Even then, provision of water resources only amounted to 0.24% of 
the total budget for the ministry of agriculture and water resources (Budget, 2007). The related 
poor access to pipe-borne water exposes the poor, who cannot sink boreholes, to unhygienic 
water sources such as unprotected wells, rivers and ponds (NBS, 2005).  
The general pattern of the incidence of spending on the public services discussed in the 
previous sections is also found for both pipe-borne water and electricity. For example, table 5 
                                                           
14 As part of his seminal work on benefit incidence in Malaysia, Meerman (1979) asked respondents which service 
they needed most. Rural Malaysians placed clean water high on their list of important services, even though they 
were expecting to pay the full cost of its provision. Participatory poverty assessments in Africa have found water to 
be an acute priority among the rural poor, especially in the drier savannah regions (Norton et al, 1995). Water 
complements health services in improving the health status of the poor (Demery, 2000). Hammer et al (1995) found 
that water supply was a critical variable in explaining regional variations in infant mortality rates (immunization 
rates were also important). 
 
15 It is now widely recognized that economic development and energy consumption are interdependent (Burney, 
1995). Moroney et al (1990) estimated regression coefficient for energy consumption with respect to GNP at close 
to 0.9. Households need electricity for business activities, agricultural activities, refrigeration, cooking, lighting, etc. 
In the absence of electricity, 80% of Nigerians households use wood-fuel and charcoal for cooking (Osaghae, 2009).  
 
16The data on pipe-borne water and electricity in Nigeria only contain information on ownership of these public 
services, not on access. But we are aware that in Africa, those who do not own pipe-borne water can access it 
through their neighbours. So accessibility to pipe-borne water can be higher than their ownership but the difference 





shows that 14 % and 29% of public spending on pipe-borne water respectively benefited the 
poorest and the richest quintiles in Nigeria. The gap in this incidence of spending is lower than 
observed  in  some  other  Sub-Saharan  African  countries.  For  example,  Demery  (2000) 
demonstrated that 11% and 40% of public spending on pipe-borne water respectively benefitted 
the poorest quintile and richest quintiles in Tanzania. 
In the case of electricity, the share for the richest quintile is more than double (29%) that 
of the poorest quintile (13%). Lack of access to electricity leaves poor households with the 
options of kerosene and firewood to generate electricity.
17 
In terms of regional distribution of pipe-borne water and electricity, table 6 shows that 
32% of public spending on pipe-borne water occurred in the Northwest as opposed to just 6% in 
the  Southeast.  In  the  case  of  public  spending  on  electricity,  these  figures  were  33%  in  the 
Southwest and just 8% in the Northeast. Table 6 also presents the urban/rural divide in public 
spending  on  pipe-borne  water  and  electricity.  The  table  shows  that  urban  areas  respectively 
received 84% and 77% of public spending on pipe-borne water and electricity in Nigeria, as 
opposed to 16% and 23% in rural areas. The urban/rural gap in the incidence of public spending 
in Nigeria is more pronounced in the case of water and electricity than in the cases of education 
and health. This apparent neglect of rural areas in terms of social amenities may account for the 
high rate of rural–urban migration in Nigeria (Oluwasola, 2007). 
Table 5: Benefit incidence of public spending on pipe-borne water and electricity in Nigeria 
  Pipe-borne water  Electricity 
Quintile  Participation rate 
 
Share by quintile 
 
Participation rate  Share by quintile 
Poorest  0.143  0.140  0.302  0.133 
Poor  0.167  0.163  0.349  0.154 
Average  0.179  0.175  0.428  0.188 
Rich  0.242  0.236  0.534  0.235 
Richest  0.293  0.286  0.656  0.289 
All  0.205  1.00  0.454  1.00 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NBS (2004) 
                                                           
17 The health and environmental consequences of generating light from these sources have been documented by 




Table 6: Benefit incidence of public spending on pipe-borne water and electricity based on 
location and regions 
  Pipe-borne Water  Electricity 
Region  Participation rate 
 




Share by region/location 
 
South-south  0.119  0.087  0.405  0.134 
Southeast      0.093  0.055  0.491  0.131 
Southwest  0.280  0.267  0.763  0.329 
North-central  0.259  0.182  0.395  0.125 
Northeast   0.143  0.093  0.276  0.081 
Northwest  0.252  0.316  0.355  0.201 
All  0.205  1.00  0.454  1.00 
Urban  0.390  0.840  0.793  0.770 
Rural  0.059  0.160  0.187  0.230 
All  0.205  1.00  0.454  1.00 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NBS (2004) 
4.2 Results and Discussion of Progressivity of Public Spending in Nigeria 
In  this  subsection,  we  supplement  the  benefit  incidence  analysis  with  a  progressivity 
analysis. Figures 1 to 7, as presented in Appendix 1, suggest that the concentration curves for 
each of the public services considered in this study lie above the Lorenz curve but below the 
diagonal, indicating that public spending on them is relatively progressive. This implies that 
public services were more evenly distributed than household spending (income). This fact is 
established  in  table  7,  which  shows  that  the  Gini  coefficients  are  greater  than  the 
concentration  indices  of  participation  for  each  of  the  public  services  considered.  (The 
differences between these Gini coefficients and the concentration indices of the benefits are 
also significant.) However, since the concentration curves for the participation rates of these 
public services do not lie above the diagonal, it shows that spending is not progressive in 
absolute terms. This either indicates that they are not well targeted at the poor or that spending 
on these services is not pro-poor. In other words, public spending on these public services in 




This reinforces the findings of benefit incidence reported in tables 1, 3 and 5 (the tables 
show that less than 20% of total spending on all the public services considered in this study 
went to the poorest quintile). The fact that the spending is regressive in absolute terms implies 
that the poorest 20% get less than 20% of the benefit of public spending on the public services 
considered in this study.  
However, table 7 shows that spending on primary school (concentration index = 0.08) 
is  more  progressive  than  the  spending  on  secondary  school  (concentration  index  =  0.12). 
Similarly, spending on child vaccinations (concentration index = 0.02) is more progressive 
than  spending  on  prenatal  (concentration  index  =  0.17)  and  postnatal  consultations 
(concentration index = 0.18). Likewise, spending on pipe-borne water (concentration index = 
0.26) is more progressive than spending on electricity (concentration index = 0.28). The most 
progressive spending was on vaccinations, with a concentration index of 0.02. The reason for 
this is not difficult to imagine. Deliberate attempts were made by vaccination agencies with 
the support of international donors to reach the poor and disadvantaged. The vaccinators visit 
both  public  schools  and  religious  establishments  in  rural  areas,  and  generally  provide 
vaccinations free of charge. Nonetheless, the vaccination rate of about 46% is still low given 
the  importance  of  vaccination  in  preventing  deadly  diseases.  Many  reasons  have  been 
suggested to explain this low vaccination rate in Nigeria,
18 including religious and cultural 






                                                           
18  According  to  NBS  (2004),  the  reasons  for  non-participation  in  vaccination  programme  as  given  by  the 
respondents are; ignorance about the vaccination (27%), long distance to vaccination centre (20%), short supply of 
vaccine (7%), too costly (3%) and other reasons (41%). Under the other reasons, is where religious and cultural 




Table 7: Gini and concentration indices for education, health and infrastructure in Nigeria 
Public service  Gini coefficient  Concentration index  Difference  T-ratio  Remark 
Primary school  0.431  0.081  -0.350  -10.379*  Relatively progressive 
Secondary school  0.411  0.117  -0.294  -15.395*  Relatively progressive 
Vaccination  0.409  0.021  -0.388  -9.367*  Relatively progressive 
Prenatal consultation 0.378  0.170  -0.208  -11.382*  Relatively progressive 
Postnatal 
consultation 
0.391  0.179  -0.212  -10.943*  Relatively progressive 
Pipe-borne water  0.422  0.261  -0.161  -8.945*  Relatively progressive 
Electricity  0.422  0.283  -0.138  -11.592*  Relatively progressive 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBS (2004)  
* denotes a statistical difference between the concentration index and the Gini coefficient at a 5% 
significance level 
4.3 Results and Discussion of Marginal Benefit Incidence of Public Spending in Nigeria 
The result of marginal benefit incidence analysis presented in table 8 suggests that a 1% 
increase  in  spending  on  primary  school  enrolment,  secondary  school  enrolment,  child 
vaccinations,  prenatal  consultation,  postnatal  consultation,  access  to  pipe-borne  water  and 
electricity will lead to increases of 1.16% for primary school enrolment, 1.04% for secondary 
school  enrolment,  1.10%  for  child  vaccinations,  1.16%  for  prenatal  consultations,  0.92% 
postnatal consultation, 0.78% for access of water and 1.00% for electricity among the poorest 
income group. The same values for the richest income group were about 0.84% (primary school 
enrolment), 0.79% (secondary school enrolment), 0.87% (child vaccination), 0.71% (prenatal 
consultation), 0.74% (postnatal consultation), 1.18% (access to water) and 0.88% (electricity). 
This table implies that the poorest group would benefit more than the richest group from an 
expansion of primary school, secondary school, child vaccinations, prenatal consultations and 
access to electricity, while the richest income group would benefit more than the poorest income 




The poor and average income groups would benefit more than the other income groups 
from an expansion of postnatal health care provisions. 
Since  children  from  the  poorest  group  are  more  likely  to  attend  public  primary  and 
secondary schools than children from the richest group, it is possible that increasing spending on 
public schools would benefit children from the poorest group more than children from the richest 
group.  In  general,  public  primary  school  is  tuition  free  and  public  secondary  schools  are 
subsidized in Nigeria, which means that expanding access improves access for children from the 
poorest group. While school-aged children from the richest quintile may often continue their 
education in private secondary schools even with an expansion of public primary and secondary 
schools, middle income households may decide to take advantage of expanded opportunities in 
primary and secondary education and could therefore benefit more than the richest income group 
from an expansion of primary and secondary school education in Nigeria. This may explain the 
higher marginal benefit incidences of spending on primary school for the poor (1.0333) and 
average  (1.0224)  income  groups  than  for  the  richest  income  group  (0.8391)  in  Nigeria  (see 
equation 12 for the mathematical definition of these statistics).  
An  expansion  in  the  child  vaccination  programme  would  benefit  the  poorest  income 
group more than the richest income group because the poorest households tend to have more 
children than the richest ones and hence may need this service more than households in the 
richest income group. The positive effect of the UNICEF vaccination campaign in Nigeria may 
also explain the improved odds of vaccination for children from the poorest households, in part 
due to efforts to reach out to public schools and religious places of worship to target children in 
these households. 
Table  8  reveals  that  the  poorest  group  will  benefit  more  than  the  richest  from  an 
expansion of prenatal consultations, while the middle income group will benefit more in the case 
of  postnatal  consultations.  Adekolu-John  (1989)  demonstrated  that  postnatal  care  was  not  a 
priority to nursing mothers in Nigeria (the majority of whom are illiterate and poor) and was not 
even a priority to health care providers.
19 This may explain the fact that, even if provisions for 
postnatal care are expanded, the poorest group are unlikely to benefit as much as the middle 
                                                           




income  group  from  increased  service  because  the  poorest  group  may  not  consider  postnatal 
health care as a necessity once their child has been safely delivered. 
Table 8 also indicates that the richest group will benefit more that the poorest group if the 
government were to decide to expand pipe-borne water supply. This is because the distribution 
of pipe-borne water was not in the favour of the poor in Nigeria. Table 6 shows that 84% of 
public spending on access to pipe-borne water was in urban areas, while the other 16% was in 
rural areas. If this distribution bias against rural areas is not corrected for, the weight of the poor 
living in rural areas means that an expansion of public provisions for pipe-borne water may not 
have relatively larger gains for the poorest income group. Another constraint relates to setup fees 
for opening a piped water connection: increase supply of piped water may not benefit the poor, 
who may not be able to afford these initial charges. 
It  appears  that  increased  provisions  for  electricity  supply  in  Nigeria  will  benefit  the 
poorest  group  more  than  the  richest  income  group  because  most  wealthy  households  have 
backup generators at home, while the poorest income groups can use new electricity supply for 
lighting and other activities.  
The general observation about the marginal benefit incidence in Nigeria, as presented in 
Table 8, is that the marginal benefit incidence is higher for the poorest income group in relation 
to public services which are most used by the poorest income group (as is the case for primary 
school, secondary school, child vaccination, prenatal consultation and access to electricity), and 
the marginal benefit incidence is low for the poorest income group in the public services which 
those in the poorest income group are less likely to use (such as postnatal consultation and access 
to  pipe-borne  water).  The  poorest  income  group’s  participation  rates  were  60%  for  primary 
school, 39% for secondary school, 44% for child vaccinations, 28% for prenatal consultations 
and 30% for access to electricity and were just 12% for postnatal consultation and 14% for 
access to pipe-borne water, as indicated in table 8. This suggests that the poor’s initial rate of 
access to a public service may determine the relative extent to which the poor will benefit from 
an  expansion  of  that  public  service.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  marginal  benefit 
incidences estimated by Ajwad and Wodon (2003; 2007). They indicated that there are important 
differences between the marginal benefit incidences for different types of services, and that the 




when the non-poor already have high levels of access. Relatively low access rates thus suggest 
that special efforts may be needed to ensure that the poor benefit from future increases in access. 
Table 8: Marginal benefit incidence of public spending in Nigeria 
Public service  Poorest  Poor  Average  Rich  Richest  Participation rate by the poorest 
quintile (%) 
Primary school  1.1586  1.0333  1.0224  0.9466  0.8391  60 
Secondary school  1.0394  1.0164  1.0986  1.0532  0.7924  39 
Vaccination  1.0963  0.9267  1.3890  0.7148  0.8732  44 
Prenatal consultation  1.1633  1.1003  1.0280  0.9996  0.7088  28 
Postnatal consultation  0.9179  1.2438  1.1693  0.9256  0.7433  12 
Pipe-borne water  0.7759  0.7814  0.9624  1.3053  1.1751  14 
Electricity  1.0047  0.9834  1.1243  1.0083  0.8784  30 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBS (2004) 
5.0 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
In  general,  spending  on  public  services  in  Nigeria  is  relatively  progressive  (the 
distribution of public services are more evenly distributed than the income) but is not pro-poor. 
There is marked disparity between access to these services in rural and urban areas, with urban 
areas having more than 50 percent of the share of the spending on the public services considered 
in this study. There are also regional inequalities in the share of these public services. The south 
has a greater share of spending on primary schools, secondary schools and vaccinations than the 
north, while the north has a greater share of spending on prenatal and postnatal consultation, 
water and electricity than the south.  
An analysis of the marginal benefit of incidence of spending on public services in Nigeria 
indicates that the poorest group will benefit more from an increase in spending on public services 
which  they  are  already  relatively  more  likely  to  use.  This  is  the  case  for  primary  school 
enrolment, secondary school enrolment, child vaccination, prenatal consultation and access to 




A  number  of  recommendations  can  be  made  on  the  basis  of  this  paper.  Generally 
speaking, there is a need for pro-poor policies so that the poor can benefit sooner from improved 
access to public services in Nigeria. The goal of having pro-poor development policy requires 
that equity should be a central consideration when financing development strategies in order to 
reach the most disadvantaged groups in Nigeria. This can be done in Nigeria by spending more 
in rural areas to expand access to these social services. Regional disparities can be bridged by 
having  greater  increases  to  educational  opportunities  and  vaccination  programmes  in  the 
northern  parts  of  Nigeria  and  devoting  more  resources  to  expanding  access  to  prenatal  and 
postnatal consultations as well as infrastructure in the south. It may also be necessary to have an 
independent  ministry  of  water  resources,  rather  than  the  present  situation  of  an  integrated 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Water  Resources,  in  order  to  enhance  the  performance  of  the 
ministry of water resources. Aside from the provision of vaccines and health care facilities to the 
areas which are most in need, such as rural areas, it is also necessary to educate the populace on 
the important role of vaccinations and postnatal care in combating infant and maternal mortality, 
particularly  since  Nigeria  unfortunately  scores  second  highest  in  the  world  for  these  two 
indicators. The current National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) should be designed to make 
provisions for every Nigerian to be covered for all preventive health care such as prenatal and 
postnatal consultations. 
The  recent  10%  increase  in  electricity  rates  in  Nigeria  may  further  harm  access  to 
electricity, especially in rural areas where access is already low. Special electricity rates can be 
designed for rural dwellers so that they can make use of this service. 
Finally, we recommend that the scope of this study be enlarged by including behavioural 
responses in the analysis of the marginal benefit incidence. This may necessitate the use of panel 
data when they become available. This study can be extended further by estimating the marginal 
benefit  incidence  of  public  spending  on  other  publicly  provided  goods  such  as  roads, 
telecommunications, etc. The spatial analysis based on the 36 states plus the FCT may also be 
important to determine the state-specific marginal benefit of incidences of public expenditure. 
This may necessitate disaggregated data on the Local Government Areas in each of the states or 
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